Search results for Heidegger
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24,
00:00,
2007-07-03 19:18:07
Description: "Bush said he's addressing global warming through new technologies. "I think there needs to be time for some of these technologies to kick in, to give them a chance to work," he (More) "Bush said he's addressing global warming through new technologies. "I think there needs to be time for some of these technologies to kick in, to give them a chance to work," he said."
Technology, before it is something we use to alter the physical world around us (to get the world to do what we want), is first expressed as a mode of being-in-the-world. As Heidegger has said, the essence of technology is itself not technological. The essence, instead, is what Heidegger calls enframing. Our tendency to enframe the Being of the world, to conceptualize and organize it, to define and, in effect, conquer it is the basis of our technology. It may become clear now that our primary (and most powerful) technological device is language. This is so because the grammatical structures of our language enframe the world, making it an object, before it even comes before what we call our perception. In other words, built into the structure of our language are certain preconceptual assumptions about the nature of Being that the language-user implicitly assumes whenever they speak.
We may comment, now, on the quotation above, taken from a recent New York Times article concerning the prospects of climate change. The material success brought about by the industrial revolution highlighted man's ability to alter and control his environment. But his success has come at a price, as now that the dust has settled and revealed the post-industrial future that looms on the horizon, the tremendous cost of technological development has become clear. Our rush to gain control over nature, to objectify her, has thrown her off balance. She never has been an external object to be manipulated; she is not only outside us, but also inside us, that intimate life spring at the core of our own bodily existence. Therefore we too are out of balance. How might we right ourselves?
We know that CO2 levels must be curbed. Bush's solution is, basically, more of the same. In his eyes, we ought to use technology to fix technology. He fails to recognize that our over-reliance on the attitude of enframing is itself the problem. We cannot apply the attitude that has created our problem to solve it. Instead, we must reconceptualize our relationship with technology. To do so means, first of all, to come to terms with the technique of enframing itself. Once we know it well we can move past it, even while still making use of its methods.
Enframing, then, is the consequence of the particularly Western assumption that presence has more value than absence. In all our history since Plato, our eyes have been inclined to notice the figure before, and often in spite of, the ground. This tendency is emphasized when compared to the more Eastern perspective that allows the empty and the full to co-exist happily. For Western man, such a position seems all too relative, even nihilistic. This aversion to the leveling of the ontological playing field (the mutualizing of Being and non-being) suggested by the East must be overcome if we are to survive our transition into post-industrialism.
Some readers may have noticed my pronoun choice, as in when I say "Western man," instead of Western civilization or Western thinkers. I do this not because women are incapable of thinking, but because Western thought is characteristically masculine and phallogocentric, to use Derrida's term. We put emphasis on rationality, clarity, and literalism. At first sight, there seems to be nothing too abhorrent about striving for such goals. Making sense and being clear about what one is trying to say are indeed important if ideas are to be communicated fluently. Let us contrast this with the more feminine character of Eastern thought, which is typically more metaphorical in its attempts to show the reader, rather than tell them, the meaning it wishes to convey. It is often the case that the Western reader will see in Eastern "philosophy" something more akin to poetry than to analytic discourse. Any kernel of truth that may be found in it is thereby demoted to merely aesthetic truth, rather than the fuller, intellectually verified truth thought to be the aim of the more serious and responsible philosophers of the West. Indeed, for many Western thinkers, Rorty among them, the notion of there evening existing a thing called "philosophy" in the East is suspect. From this perspective, the East is seen as almost childish, lacking the maturity of its Western counterpart. Allowing, for the moment, that such characterizations were merited, we might respond by alluding to the benefits inherent to the innocence of childhood. In the East, humanity may indeed have a more genuine relationship with nature, not yet having developed the thick skin that estranges Western man from his home. However, it is not at all fair to characterize a cultural worldview as inherently more or less valuable than any other. Such hierarchies may indeed become necessary when the worldview of one actively threatens that of another (I am thinking here of radical Islam), but in the case of such broad characterizations as Eastern vs. Western thinking, it becomes clear that what the one forgets, the other remembers. In other words, neither is better or worse than the other; the two instead give rise to one another's difference. The one allows the other to be what it is, and in so doing to become aware of itself. We must also be clear, though, in saying that in our current ecological situation we are most definitely threatened. The threat itself is no enemy, however; it is much closer to home than that. The threat is our lack of understanding of ourselves and our tendency to enframe the world.
Technology itself is not the threat, but rather it is our use of it that has caused so much harm. Heidegger makes this clearer through an etymological examination of the Greek "techne," the root of our "technology." Techne is often translated as technique or craftsmanship and refers to any method that reveals, rather than creates, what was already present. It does not create because creation implies the construction of something out of nothingness. Technique, in the way we are using it here, refers rather to the manipulation of that which is in order to reveal a relationship formerly hidden from view. When the new pattern is brought forth, the original state becomes concealed. Such is the paradoxical nature of technology. Any gain on one end is a loss on another. There is, therefore, no such thing as technological progress. There is only technological change interpreted through the lens of cultural bias, which judges anew in each age what constitutes the good life. To return to our etymological examination of technology, it becomes apparent by our definition above that poetry, too, is a technique. How, though, might we contrast it with the usual sort of technology, that of machines designed for specific purposes in mind, of techniques which seek an end outside themselves? We might begin to distinguish the two by the ontological stance they take in relationship to the world. Mechanical technology is teleological, while poetic technology is deontological. The former is a means while the latter is an end. Similarly, the former is active while the latter is passive. Mechanics manipulate while poetics grants, as Heidegger puts it. Poetry accepts what nature gives, bringing it into view (into words) so that it can be celebrated through a kind of participatory knowledge. In a sense, poetry uses words to open the doors and windows of the mind to the undisturbed light of nature. Mechanics, in contrast, reaches, oftentimes violently, into nature and tries to divide and control it, bringing specialized factual knowledge into view while at the same time concealing one's own shadow. This shadow is what estranges us from Being, leaving us with only beings, with things and objects, which we then feel compelled to organize and control.
In the East, hieroglyphics are still in use. In the West, the alphabet took over some 2,500 years ago, when the Greek mind systematized Egyptian glyphs and modeled the written word on the voice. It is as though the organic whole of the hieroglyphic word was torn asunder and mechanized, reduced into discrete components. The assault upon the hieroglyph itself was an assault on the hieroglyphic worldspace, as well.
Am I advocating a return or remodeling of our phonetic alphabet to an ideogramatic system like those of the East? Possibly. What is clear is that our ecological crisis is really a spiritual crisis. That is, our relationship with nature is imbalanced because we are estranged from Being. Our estrangement from Being has come about because of our use of language. Therefore, to recognize Being once more, to harmonize our relationship with nature, we must reconceptualize our use of language. "Language is the house of Being," as Heidegger says. We ought to take care, then, not to track mud on the carpet. (Less) Channel: youtube
19,
02:40,
2007-12-26 16:00:42
Description: Here, on German television, Heidegger repeats the importance of his long-standing concern with the forgetting of the question of Being, but then offers an interesting analogy between the (few) (More) Here, on German television, Heidegger repeats the importance of his long-standing concern with the forgetting of the question of Being, but then offers an interesting analogy between the (few) physicists who understand how a radio or television works and equally scarce 'thinkers' who have a proper understanding of the question of Being ...
In his 'Introduction to Metaphysics' (1935), Heidegger remarks: "... philosophy is always the concern of the few. Which few? The creators, those who initiate profound transformations. It spreads only indirectly, by devious paths that can never be laid out in advance, until at last, at some future date, it sinks to the level of a common-place; but by then it has long been forgotten as original philosophy." (Less) Channel: youtube
27,
06:02,
2008-06-26 00:00:00
Description: * Lang: German / Deutsch * Nano Reportage auf 3sat Siehe hierzu auch die Psychologismus-Debatte Anfang des 20. Jh. und Husserls Gegenargument in den "Logischen Untersuchungen". Hier (More) * Lang: German / Deutsch * Nano Reportage auf 3sat Siehe hierzu auch die Psychologismus-Debatte Anfang des 20. Jh. und Husserls Gegenargument in den "Logischen Untersuchungen". Hier wird tatsächlich mit den gleichen Argumenten wie vor 100 Jahren um die immer gleiche alte Sache gestritten. Zur Frage nach einer zentralen Instanz im Gehirn, welche die Daten bündelt und verarbeitet, siehe das Homunculus-Argument von John Locke: Wenn wir sinnlich nur Bilder wahrnehmen, dann müsste im Gehirn nochmals eine Instanz sein, die diese Bilder anschaut: "So wie auch schon in der Camera obscura jemand stehen muss, um die Bilder an der Wand sehen zu können, so muss auch im Bewusstseinszimmer ein Betrachter der Ideen unterstellt werden, ein homunculus, der sich die Repräsentationen im Geist anschaut." Heidegger hat stets vor jeglichem Weltbild gewarnt, da es immer - als geschlossenes - einen Abschluß des Denkens darstellt. Bewegt man sich nur in ihm allein, so ist eine Widerlegung unmöglich (bspw. beim Materialismus). Alles was einem begegnet ist schon im Voraus interpretiert und ausgelegt als ein Sonderfall einer allgemeinen Wahrheit. Die Voraussetzungen aber, auf denen diese Wahrheit gründet, können selbst nicht wider in den Blick gebracht werden. Heidegger: "Man kann nicht mit den mathematischen Methoden der Physik beschreiben, was die Physik als Wissenschaft ist." Anders formuliert: "Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht." Denken meint hier also eine Besinnung über die eigenen Voraussetzungen der Weltauffassung und -auslegung. Auch zur Neurophysiologie ein interessantes Argument von Heidegger, damals, als diese Disziplin so noch nicht bestand, ging es noch allgemein gegen den Materialismus und die Frage nach der Willensfreiheit: Man versucht immer wider wissenschaftlich die Frage nach der Möglichkeit einer Willensfreiheit zu erklären, allerdings setzt man dazu im Voraus - entsprechend des wissenschaftlichen Weltbildes - schon ein deterministisches Bild der Natur an. Man sucht also nach &qu (Less) Channel: veoh
19,
07:07,
2008-06-26 08:22:57
Description: Heidegger liest Hölderlin
Teil 2 von 2
Channel: youtube
10,
00:00,
2008-04-21 16:48:41
Description: "Bush said he's addressing global warming through new technologies. "I think there needs to be time for some of these technologies to kick in, to give them a chance to work," he (More) "Bush said he's addressing global warming through new technologies. "I think there needs to be time for some of these technologies to kick in, to give them a chance to work," he said." Technology, before it is something we use to alter the physical world around us (to get the world to do what we want), is first expressed as a mode of being-in-the-world. As Heidegger has said, the essence of technology is itself not technological. The essence, instead, is what Heidegger calls enframing. Our tendency to enframe the Being of the world, to conceptualize and organize it, to define and, in effect, conquer it is the basis of our technology. It may become clear now that our primary (and most powerful) technological device is language. This is so because the grammatical structures of our language enframe the world, making it an object, before it even comes before what we call our perception. In other words, built into the structure of our language are certain preconceptual assumptions about the nature of Being that the language-user implicitly assumes whenever they speak. We may comment, now, on the quotation above, taken from a recent New York Times article concerning the prospects of climate change. The material success brought about by the industrial revolution highlighted man's ability to alter and control his environment. But his success has come at a price, as now that the dust has settled and revealed the post-industrial future that looms on the horizon, the tremendous cost of technological development has become clear. Our rush to gain control over nature, to objectify her, has thrown her off balance. She never has been an external object to be manipulated; she is not only outside us, but also inside us, that intimate life spring at the core of our own bodily existence. Therefore we too are out of balance. How might we right ourselves? We know that CO2 levels must be curbed. Bush's solution is, basically, more of the same. In his eyes, we ought to use technology to fix technology. He fails to recognize that our over-reliance on the attitude of enframing is itself the problem. We cannot apply the attitude that has created our problem to solve it. Instead, we must reconceptualize our relationship with technology. To do so means, first of all, to come to terms with the technique of enframing itself. Once we know it well we can move past it, even while still making use of its methods. Enframing, then, is the consequence of the particularly Western assumption that presence has more value than absence. In all our history since Plato, our eyes have been inclined to notice the figure before, and often in spite of, the ground. This tendency is emphasized when compared to the more Eastern perspective that allows the empty and the full to co-exist happily. For Western man, such a position seems all too relative, even nihilistic. This aversion to the leveling of the ontological playing field (the mutualizing of Being and non-being) suggested by the East must be overcome if we are to survive our transition into post-industrialism. Some readers may have noticed my pronoun choice, as in when I say "Western man," instead of Western civilization or Western thinkers. I do this not because women are incapable of thinking, but because Western thought is characteristically masculine and phallogocentric, to use Derrida's term. We put emphasis on rationality, clarity, and literalism. At first sight, there seems to be nothing too abhorrent about striving for such goals. Making sense and being clear about what one is trying to say are indeed important if ideas are to be communicated fluently. Let us contrast this with the more feminine character of Eastern thought, which is typically more metaphorical in its attempts to show the reader, rather than tell them, the meaning it wishes to convey. It is often the case that the Western reader will see in Eastern "philosophy" something more akin to poetry than to analytic discourse. Any kernel of truth that may be found in it is thereby demoted to merely aesthetic truth, rather than the fuller, intellectually verified truth thought to be the aim of the more serious and responsible philosophers of the West. Indeed, for many Western thinkers, Rorty among them, the notion of there evening existing a thing called "philosophy" in the East is suspect. From this perspective, the East is seen as almost childish, lacking the maturity of its Western counterpart. Allowing, for the moment, that such characterizations were merited, we might respond by alluding to the benefits inherent to the innocence of childhood. In the East, humanity may indeed have a more genuine relationship with nature, not yet having developed the thick skin that estranges Western man from his home. However, it is not at all fair to characterize a cultural worldview as inherently more or less valuable than any other. Such hierarchies may indeed become necessary when the worldview of one actively threatens that of another (I am thinking here of radical Islam), but in the case of such broad characterizations as Eastern vs. Western thinking, it becomes clear that what the one forgets, the other remembers. In other words, neither is better or worse than the other; the two instead give rise to one another's difference. The one allows the other to be what it is, and in so doing to become aware of itself. We must also be clear, though, in saying that in our current ecological situation we are most definitely threatened. The threat itself is no enemy, however; it is much closer to home than that. The threat is our lack of understanding of ourselves and our tendency to enframe the world. Technology itself is not the threat, but rather it is our use of it that has caused so much harm. Heidegger makes this clearer through an etymological examination of the Greek "techne," the root of our "technology." Techne is often translated as technique or craftsmanship and refers to any method that reveals, rather than creates, what was already present. It does not create because creation implies the construction of something out of nothingness. Technique, in the way we are using it here, refers rather to the manipulation of that which is in order to reveal a relationship formerly hidden from view. When the new pattern is brought forth, the original state becomes concealed. Such is the paradoxical nature of technology. Any gain on one end is a loss on another. There is, therefore, no such thing as technological progress. There is only technological change interpreted through the lens of cultural bias, which judges anew in each age what constitutes the good life. To return to our etymological examination of technology, it becomes apparent by our definition above that poetry, too, is a technique. How, though, might we contrast it with the usual sort of technology, that of machines designed for specific purposes in mind, of techniques which seek an end outside themselves? We might begin to distinguish the two by the ontological stance they take in relationship to the world. Mechanical technology is teleological, while poetic technology is deontological. The former is a means while the latter is an end. Similarly, the former is active while the latter is passive. Mechanics manipulate while poetics grants, as Heidegger puts it. Poetry accepts what nature gives, bringing it into view (into words) so that it can be celebrated through a kind of participatory knowledge. In a sense, poetry uses words to open the doors and windows of the mind to the undisturbed light of nature. Mechanics, in contrast, reaches, oftentimes violently, into nature and tries to divide and control it, bringing specialized factual knowledge into view while at the same time concealing one's own shadow. This shadow is what estranges us from Being, leaving us with only beings, with things and objects, which we then feel compelled to organize and control. In the East, hieroglyphics are still in use. In the West, the alphabet took over some 2,500 years ago, when the Greek mind systematized Egyptian glyphs and modeled the written word on the voice. It is as though the organic whole of the hieroglyphic word was torn asunder and mechanized, reduced into discrete components. The assault upon the hieroglyph itself was an assault on the hieroglyphic worldspace, as well. Am I advocating a return or remodeling of our phonetic alphabet to an ideogramatic system like those of the East? Possibly. What is clear is that our ecological crisis is really a spiritual crisis. That is, our relationship with nature is imbalanced because we are estranged from Being. Our estrangement from Being has come about because of our use of language. Therefore, to recognize Being once more, to harmonize our relationship with nature, we must reconceptualize our use of language. "Language is the house of Being," as Heidegger says. We ought to take care, then, not to track mud on the carpet. (Less) Channel: youtube
16,
01:33,
2008-04-21 16:48:52
Description: Here, on German television, Heidegger rebuts Marx's famous claim that philosophers only interpret and do not actually change the world ... Heidegger replies that philosophy is essential in any (More) Here, on German television, Heidegger rebuts Marx's famous claim that philosophers only interpret and do not actually change the world ... Heidegger replies that philosophy is essential in any *concept* of social-political change, including, of course, Marx's concept of a classless society: Richard Wisser: ... Do you think philosophy has a social mission? Heidegger: No! One can't speak of a social mission in that sense! To answer that question, we must first ask: "What is society?" We have to consider that today's society is only modern subjectivity made absolute. A philosophy that has overcome a position of subjectivity therefore has to say no in the matter. Another question is to what extent we can speak of a change of society at all. The question of the demand for world change leads us back to Karl Marx's frequently quoted statement from his Theses on Feuerbach. I would like to quote it exactly and read out loud: "Philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; what matters is to change it." When this statement is cited and when it is followed, it is overlooked that changing the world presupposes a change in the conception of the world. A conception of the world can only be won by adequately interpreting the world. That means: Marx's demand for a "change" is based upon on a very definite interpretation of the world, and therefore this statement is proved to be without foundation. It gives the impression that it speaks decisively against philosophy, whereas the second half of the statement presupposes, unspoken, a demand for philosophy. (Less) Channel: youtube
16,
02:28,
2008-04-21 17:46:29
Description: These clips are from a 1975 German documentary on Heidegger by Richard Wisser and Walter Rüdel... Heidegger is seen walking through Freiburg (SW Germany) and also reviewing handwritten (More) These clips are from a 1975 German documentary on Heidegger by Richard Wisser and Walter Rüdel... Heidegger is seen walking through Freiburg (SW Germany) and also reviewing handwritten manuscripts... his famous Todtnauberg (Black Forest) cottage (Die Hütte) is then shown... here, Heidegger composed many works, including 'Being and Time' ('Sein und Zeit') in the 1920s... the documentary discusses many themes including the relationship of humans to language and Heidegger's underscoring of the 'task of thinking' ... numerous interviews are employed, including one with French philosopher Jean Beaufret who was key in introducing Heidegger to a generation of post World War Two French thinkers... 'Im Denken unterwegs' translates as 'On the way to thinking' - a critical notion for Heidegger in the eventual replacing of traditional, metaphysical thought... (Less) Channel: youtube
17,
03:36,
2008-04-21 17:46:29
Description: Heidegger's famous Black Forest cabin at Todtnauberg (where he wrote many of his key works, including 'Being and Time') is shown here by his son Hermann, commented upon by literary (More) Heidegger's famous Black Forest cabin at Todtnauberg (where he wrote many of his key works, including 'Being and Time') is shown here by his son Hermann, commented upon by literary critic George Steiner in terms of its influence, and remembered by acclaimed German philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer... Gadamer, recalling visits to the cabin, felt that Heidegger looked like a rural Black Forest resident, dressed as a 'handyman,' but that Heidegger's 'eyes' showed great 'imagination' - undoubtedly underscoring Heidegger's unique, philosophical mission... (Less) Channel: youtube
9,
00:56,
2008-04-21 17:46:29
Description: Heidegger's influence on French existential philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre is well-chronicled - as the clip states, Sartre's main work 'Being and Nothingness' (1943) was conceived as (More) Heidegger's influence on French existential philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre is well-chronicled - as the clip states, Sartre's main work 'Being and Nothingness' (1943) was conceived as a companion piece to Heidegger's 'Being and Time' (though Heidegger would later repudiate Sartre's view, labeling it 'metaphysics'). Sartre, seen here with long-time companion Simone de Beauvoir, was a key figure in reviving Heidegger following World War II... Heidegger biographer Hugo Ott also comments upon this post War influence... (Less) Channel: youtube
11,
02:28,
2008-06-26 07:19:12
Description: Heidegger liest Hölderlin
Channel: youtube
2,
08:39,
2008-04-21 17:46:29
Description: Heidegger life and Philosophy
Channel: youtube
15,
06:34,
2008-04-21 17:46:29
Description: Martin Heidegger's 1927 magnum opus 'Being and Time' ('Sein und Zeit') is regarded as a twentieth-century philosophical classic... such notions as temporality, angst, (More) Martin Heidegger's 1927 magnum opus 'Being and Time' ('Sein und Zeit') is regarded as a twentieth-century philosophical classic... such notions as temporality, angst, authenticity, resolve, The One, The Other, being-toward-death, everydayness, etc., became standard verbiage in later Existentialism... here, philosopher Andrew Benjamin, literary critic George Steiner, and Hannah Arendt biographer Elizabeth Young-Bruel discuss the impact of this monumental work... (Less) Channel: youtube
3,
02:08,
2008-04-21 17:46:29
Description: Heidegger concludes his 1969 German television interview with Richard Wisser in the following way: "No one knows what the fate of thinking will look like. In a lecture in Paris in 1964, which I (More) Heidegger concludes his 1969 German television interview with Richard Wisser in the following way: "No one knows what the fate of thinking will look like. In a lecture in Paris in 1964, which I did not give myself but was presented in a French translation, I spoke under the title: "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking." I thus make a *distinction* between philosophy, that is metaphysics, and thinking as I understand it. The thinking that I contrast with philosophy in this lecture—which is principally done by an attempt to clarify the essence of the Greek "aletheia" (unhiddenness) — this thinking is, compared to metaphysical thinking, much simpler than philosophy, but precisely because of its simplicity it is much more difficult to carry out. And it calls for new care with language, not the invention of new terms, as I once thought, but a return to the primordial content of our own language, which is, however, constantly in the process of dying off. A coming thinker, who will perhaps be faced with the task of really taking over this thinking that I am attempting to *prepare,* will have to obey a sentence Heinrich von Kleist once wrote, and that reads "I step back before one who is not yet here, and bow, a millennium before him, to his spirit." (Less) Channel: youtube
4,
02:46,
2008-04-21 17:46:29
Description: Heidegger's philosophy is largely concerned with the historical role of post-Socratic Greek thought and the oblivion of Being - Heidegger always favored the fragments and poetic sayings of the (More) Heidegger's philosophy is largely concerned with the historical role of post-Socratic Greek thought and the oblivion of Being - Heidegger always favored the fragments and poetic sayings of the pre-Socratics ... finally, in 1962, he traveled to Greece and is here shown at the Acropolis and at Delphi ... however it was at Delos (not shown) where he truly felt the "presence of that which grants Being-present" (Safranski) ... in the second part of the clip Heidegger responds to charges that he is only concerned with Being and not with human beings: "Being *needs* human beings.... One cannot ask about Being without asking about the essence of human beings ..." (Less) Channel: youtube
11,
01:40,
2008-04-21 17:46:29
Description: In a 1957 essay, "Hebel - Friend of the House," ("Hebel der Hausfreund") Heidegger underscores his great concern with the impoverishment of poetic language via commonplace (More) In a 1957 essay, "Hebel - Friend of the House," ("Hebel der Hausfreund") Heidegger underscores his great concern with the impoverishment of poetic language via commonplace 'calculative, instrumental' use. He discusses the importance of German poet/writer Johann Peter Hebel (1760-1826) who, he feels, embodied an authentic poetic relationship with language as personified in fellow-poet Friedrich Hölderlin's dictum "poetically... (we) dwell upon the earth." In the clip Heidegger says: "Today the notion of language as an instrument of information is driven to extremes. ... The relation of man to language is in the midst of a transformation the consequences of which we have not yet weighed. Nor can the course of this transformation be directly halted. Moreover, it proceeds in the most profound silence. It must certainly be granted that in everyday living language appears as a means of communication, and it is as such a means that is employed in the commonplace relationships of life. There are, however, relationships other than the commonplace. Goethe calls these other relationships the "deeper" ones, and says of language: 'In ordinary life, we make do with impoverished language because we only signify superficial relationships. As soon as the talk is of deeper relations, another language at once enters in - the poetic.' " (Less) Channel: youtube
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